

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-01
INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15
USIA-06 SSM-03 IO-13 MCT-01 /085 W
-----010907Z 002958 /11

R 010627Z FEB 77
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4104
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BAGHDAD 0208

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS:80*94, XF, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI VIEWS OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

1. SUMMARY: RECENT STATEMENTS BY SADDAM HUSSEIN SUGGEST THAT IRAQ IS MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF A MORE PASSIVE STANCZ TOWARDS CURRENT EFFORTS TO OBTAIN AN ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT. INDICATED IRAQI AIM IS STILL THE EVENTUAL REPLACEMENT OF ISRAEL AS A JEWISH STATE BY A "DEMOCRATIC STATE OF PALESTINE" BUT HUSSEIN NOW SEEMS WILLING TO ACCEPT AN ARAB-ISRAELI SATTLEMENT AS AN INTERIM STEP TOWARDS THIS EVENTUAL GOAL. END SUMMARY.

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2. IRAQI STRONGMAN SADDAM HUSSEIN TOOK OCCASION OF AN ADDRESS BEFORE THE IRAQI ENGINEERING FEDERATION TO DISCUSS IN SOME DETAIL THE BASIC ATTITUDES WHICH MOTIVATE IRAQ'S APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES, ESPECIALLY THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE. HUSSEIN BEGAN BY MENTIONING THAT HE HAD RECENTLY HAD A CONVERSATION WITH A LEADING WORLD FIGURE (NOT SPEC-

IFIED) IN WHICH PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM HAD BEEN URGED UPON HIM. IN RESPONSE, HUSSEIN POSED THE QUESTION OF WHY IT WAS THAT THE WORLD'S MAJOR PROPHETS HAD ALL COME FROM THE MIDDLE EAST. HE ANSWERED BY SAYING THAT CHIEF AMONG THE TRAITS OF THE PEOPLE IN THIS AREA IS THAT THEY REFUSED TO YIELD THEMSELVES EXCLUSIVELY TO MATERIAL FACTORS. AS HE DESCRIBED THE CONVERSATION, HUSSEIN PROCEEDED TO TELL THE UNNAMED WORLD FIGURE THAT MOST ARAB GOVERNMENTS MUST BE CONDITIONED IN THEIR BEHAVIOR BY THE FACT THAT THEY HAD NOT COME TO POWER BY TRADITIONAL DEMOCRATIC MEANS BUT RATHER BY COUPS AND REVOLUTIONS. IT COULD BE EXPECTED THEREFORE THAT THEY MIGHT DISAPPEAR IN THE SAME MANNER AS SOON AS THEY BEGAN TO BETRAY CAUSES SUCH AS THE PALESTINE CAUSE, THE LEVERAGE OF WHICH HAD AIDED THEIR ACCESSION TO POWER. ACCORDINGLY, ANY SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINE ISSUE MUST BE BOTH FUNDAMENTAL AND ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARAB PEOPLE. OTHERWISE ARAB LEADERS WHO MIGHT ACCEPT A SOLUTION WOULD DISAPPEAR AND THE PROBLEM WOULD RE-EMERGE.

3. WITH RESPECT TO CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL, HUSSEIN ARGUED THAT THE "ZIONIST ENEMY" WOULD SURELY REFUSE TO ACCEPT OBJECTIVES WHICH HAD BEEN DECLARED BY SOME ARAB RULERS. HUSSEIN DOES NOT ACCEPT, HOWEVER, THE COUNTER ARGUMENTS THAT ONE SHOULD OFFER TO SETTLE FOR WHAT IS BELOW THE CENTRAL ARAB TARGET SIMPLY TO EMBARRASS THE "ZIONIST ENEMY" BEFORE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION. HUSSEIN STATED HIS OPINION THAT CHANGES IN THE ATTITUDES OF INTERNATIONAL POWERS WERE NOT THE RESULT OF AN APPRECIATION THAT THE ARAB POSITION WAS RIGHT BUT RATHER THE RESULT OF THE STRENGTH

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OF THE ARAB WORLD AS EVIDENCED IN THE FITNESS OF ARAB NATIONS TO BATTLE ISRAEL IN THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR AND THE USE OF OIL AS A POLITICAL WEAPON.

4. HUSSEIN WENT ON TO ARGUE THAT "OBJECTIVE FACTORS" OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS WERE MOVING IN A DIRECTION FAVORABLE TO THE ARAB WORLD AND THAT OTHER NATIONS ARE CHANGING THEIR ATTITUDES AS THEY REALIZE THAT THE ARABS ARE PROGRESSING IN REGARD TO THE ACQUISITION OF POWER. THIS, HE NOTED, WAS A SITUATION WHICH WOULD NOT BE CHANGED BY DIPLOMATIC FORMULAS.

5. IN HIS ANALYSIS OF THE BALANCE OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES, HUSSEIN EMPHASIZED THAT THE PRESENT BI-POLAR WORLD DOES NOT PROVIDE THE ARAB NATION WITH ADEQUATE MEANS TO MANEUVER. HE EXPECTS, HOWEVER, THAT MORE CENTERS OF POWER WILL EMERGE OVER THE NEXT 20 YEARS. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES, ARGUED HUSSEIN, MUST ONE CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT AMERICA AND THE SOVIET UNION CAN AGREE BETWEEN THEMSELVES TO DECIDE THE DESTINY OF THE WORLD.

6. HUSSEIN THEN TALKED ABOUT THE QUESTION OF "FLEXIBILITY"
MAKING CLEAR THAT HE WAS REPLYING TO UNNAMED CRITICS OF
IRAQI POLICY.
HE SAID THAT ARABS QUITE RIGHTLY VIEW THEIR
RULERS WITH A DEGREE OF SUSPICION. HE STATED THAT UNLESS
FLEXIBILITY IN POLITICAL ACTION IS COUPLED WITH CLEAR-CUT
STRATEGIC GOALS, THE ARB MASSES WOULD VIEW SUCH FLEXIBILITY
AS A CLOAK FOR RETREAT. RECENT HISTORY, SAID HUSSEIN, WILL
TESTIFY THAT WHENEVER ANY ARAB RULER STARTS TALKING IN TERMS
OF FLEXIBILITY, HIS NEXT MOVE IS TO BEAT A RETREAT. TO
TALK, THEREFORE, OF PEACE WITHOUT MAKING THE NECESSARY PRE-
PARATIONS FOR WAR WOULD UNDERMINE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE BE-
TWEEN ARAB RULERS AND THEIR PEOPLE, THEREBY ERODING THE POWER
OF THE ARAB PEOPLE, ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL FACTORS OF THE
PRESENT ARAB STRENGTH.
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-----010906Z 003382 /12

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7. JUST AS WRONG, STATED HUSSEIN, WOULD BE TO IGNORE INTERNATIONAL FACTORS WHICH PREVENT THE ARABS FROM REACHING THEIR OBJECTIVES AT THIS TIME. WE KNOW WELL, HE SAID, THAT INTERNATIONAL POLICY DOES NOT NOW PERMIT THE DESTRUCTION OF THE "ZIONIST ENTITY". HOWEVER, THOSE WHO WISH TO ENTER INTO POLITICAL ACTIVITIES ON THAT BASIS MUST REALIZE THAT PRESENT INTERNATIONAL FACTORS ARE NOT THE FINAL TRUTH. IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS FACTS ARE RELATIVE AND CAN CHANGE OVER TIME. THE STRENGTH OF THE ARAB NATION PLAYS A CRUCIAL ROLE IN CAUSING FACTS TO EVOLVE. WHAT MIGHT BE REGARDED AS A FACT OF LIFE TODAY MIGHT CEASE TO BE SO TOMORROW.

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8. HUSSEIN THEN ADDRESSED SPECIFICALLY THE QUESTION OF A SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD RETURN TO THE ARABS LANDS OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL IN JUNE 1967. HE SAID THAT IRAQ WAS NOT OPPOSED TO POLITICAL ACTIVITIES, BUT FLEXIBILITY BECOMES A CLOAK FOR RETREAT UNLESS IT IS STOUTLY TIED TO THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC TARGET. THE LIBERATION OF ANY PART OF PALESTINE, HE SAID, WOULD BE A TRIUMPH BUT IT MUST NOT BE ACCEPTED AS A FINAL AIM. THE SITUATION ARISING FROM SUCH A TRIUMPH SHOULD BE DEVELOPED TOWARD LIBERATING YET ANOTHER PART OF PALESTINE.

9. HUSSEIN'S SPEECH TO ENGINEERS WAS PUBLISHED IN FRIDAY ARABIC NEWSPAPERS WITH FANFARE INDICATING IT WAS TO BE TAKEN AS MAJOR POLICY STATEMENT. TRANSLATION OF FULL TEXT APPEARED IN BAGHDAD OBSERVER OF JANUARY 29, COPIES OF WHICH HAVE BEEN POUCHED TO NEA/ARN, INR/P, AND DIA.

10. GOVERNMENT OWNED AL-JUMHURIYA PUBLISHED JANUARY 29 THE RELATED SUMMARY OF AN INTERVIEW WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN WHICH WAS TO BE PUBLISHED IN EGYPTIAN MAGAZINE AL-MUSAWWAR ON JANUARY 29. (IRAQI AUTHORITIES DO NOT NORMALLY PERMIT DISTRIBUTION OF AL-MUSAWWAR HERE.) IRAQI VERSION OF INTERVIEW HEADLINES HUSSEIN'S VIEW THAT BEST CONDITIONS FOR MOGILIZING ARAB, INCLUDING EGYPTIAN, MASSES FOR CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL ARE CONDIONS OF CONFLICT RATHER THAN PEACE. NONETHELESS, HUSSEIN EXPRESSED IN GENERAL TERMS TOLERANCE OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN OTHER ARAB LEADERS AND ISRAELIS TO ACHIEVE TRANSITIONAL AIMS, SO LONG AS ARAB NEGOTIATORS DID NOT LOSE SIGHT OF LONG RANGE AIMS AND DEMANDS OF ARAB PEOPLES. IN CONTEXT OF IRAQ'S WILLINGNESS TO TAKE BACK IRAQI JEWS WHO WANT TO LEAVE ISRAEL, HUSSEIN SUPPORTED IDEA OF A

"DEMOCRATIC STATE OF PALESTINE" TO WHICH ALL ARABS RESIDENT THERE BEFORE 1948 COULD RETURN. HE ARGUED THAT ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT WAS NOT A RELIGIOUS ONE.

11. COMMENT: PRIOR TO THESE STATEMENTS, IRAQI POSITION HAS BEEN WHOLLY NEGATIVE TO THE IDEA OF ANY NEGOTIATED CONFIDENTIAL

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SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL. CLEARLY, SADDAM HUSSEIN IS STILL FAR FROM THE POSITION OF ARAB MODERATES, BUT WE VIEW HIS REMARKS TO ENGINEERS AND TO AL-MUSAWWAR AS ATTEMPTS TO CRAWL OFF THE REJECTIONIST LIMB. IRAQI MEDIA IN RECENT WEEKS HAS SUNG REPETITIOUS REFRAIN WARNING AGAINST SETTLEMENT EFFORTS, ESPECIALLY EFFORTS TO WEAKEN PALESTINIAN RESOLVE TO FIGHT ON. GIVEN IRAQ'S PAST SUPPORT FOR REJECTIONIST PALESTINIAN GROUPS, IT SEEMED LIKELY THAT IRAQ WOULD SUPPORT TERRORIST OPERATIONS AIMING AT SABOTAGE OF ANY ARRANGEMENTS TO RESUME GENEVA CONFERENCE. THIS SEEMS MUCH LESS LIKELY TO US NOW. WE BELIEVE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN, WHO HAS GRADUALLY STRENGTHENED HIS INTERNAL POSITION, MAY FEEL STRONG ENOUGH NOW TO RESIST REJECTIONIST IDEALOGUES AMONG BAATH PARTY MEMBERS. HE SURELY APPRECIATES THAT IRAQ AS A STATE COULD ONLY ISOLATE ITSELF FURTHER IF IT OPPOSED ARAB CONSENSUS, WHICH INCLUDED A MAJOR SHARE OF THE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP, TO ENTER INTO A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL.

12. SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD, OF COURSE, LIKE TO KEEP HIS RADICAL CREDENTIALS WHILE AT THE SAME TIME BACKING IRAQ WARILY OUT OF ITS ISOLATED POSITION. IN HIS SPEECH TO THE ENGINEERS HE REFRAINED FROM ANY POLEMICS AGAINST THE U.S. OR IMPERIALISM AND REFERRED TO THE U.S. AND THE U.S.S.R. IN PRECISELY EQUAL TERMS AS "CENTERS OF POWER". HE SEEMED AWARE THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT ALSO SUPPORT AN ARAB CONSENSUS THAT THE TIME FOR A SETTLEMENT HAD COME. IN GENERAL, WE SEE HUSSEIN'S TWO STATEMENTS AS A CAREFULLY CALCULATED EFFORT TO PREPARE IRAQ'S PUBLIC AND IRAQ'S REJECTIONIST CLIENTS FOR A SHIFT BY IRAQ TO A MORE PASSIVE STANCE DURING THE COMING NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, GOVERNMENT REACTIONS, PEACE PLANS, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 01-Feb-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977BAGHDA00208
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770035-0230
Format: TEL
From: BAGHDAD
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
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Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770287/aaaaczcz.tel
Line Count: 267
Litigation Code IDs:
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Litigation History:
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Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
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Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3446013
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: IRAQI VIEWS OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, IZ
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/8c7408ce-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009